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COMMENTS
Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants
In Pennsylvania Employment Contracts
I.

Introduction

In the absence of a contrary agreement between employer and
employee, the law does not prevent an ex-employee from competing
in business with his former employer.' Restrictive covenants often
are included in employment contracts, however, to prevent ex-em-

ployees from engaging in competition with their former employers,2 to
prohibit divulgence of trade secrets,' and to prevent solicitation of
their ex-employers' customers.
This comment first examines the historical development of re-

strictive covenants in Pennsylvania employment contracts. Next, the
current requirements for legal enforceability are examined. Finally,

the remedies available to employers upon breach of the restraints
are explored.
II.

Prerequisites to Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants

Consistent with the belief that a man has a right "to engage in a
lawful business anywhere and at any time,"4 early common law held
any restriction on an ex-employee's competing with his former employer to be an illegal restraint of trade and, therefore, unenforcea1. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 626, 136 A.2d 838,
844 (1957).
2. See notes 15-128 and accompanying text infra.
3. Although the scope of this comment is limited to covenants not to compete,
a covenant not to use or divulge trade secrets usually accompanies a covenant not
to compete. Trilog Assoc., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
In this area Pennsylvania still adheres to the Macbeth-Evans rule that prohibits divulgence of trade secrets obtained in the course of a confidential relationship. Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 85-86, 86 A. 688, 690 (1913). Included in this category of trade secrets are customer lists, customer information, and
customer contracts. Compare Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Drayton, 378 F. Supp.
824 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (customer lists, lists of policy expiration dates held confidential); Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974) (customer lists of temporary help held confidential); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v.
Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957), with Trilog Assoc., Inc. v. Famularo,
455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974) (general information not confidential).
4. General Office Equip. Corp. v. Sampson, 90 Pitts. L.J. 179, 189 (Pa. C.P.
Alleg. 1941).

ble.5 As part of the development of modem commercial law, however, courts gradually adopted the position that covenants not to
compete were both permissible and enforceable under certain circumstances. 6 In the late nineteenth century, Pennsylvania courts began to
distinguish between contracts in general restraint of trade 7 and those

in partial restraint.8

This classification separated restrictive agree-

ments that covered the entire country, which were general restraints
and void, from those that covered only a small area. 9 For a covenant

to be valid, it had to be founded on valuable consideration, be
reasonable, and impose no general restraint on trade or industry. 10
This rule, which looked to the nature and effect of the restriction as

well as its scope, was a flexible substitute for the original position that
all contracts in restraint of trade were necessarily void."- Pennsylvania courts have continued to use this test, in which the critical issue
is whether the contract is a reasonable or unreasonable restraint of

trade.' 2 If reasonable, the restriction is valid.' 3 Pennsylvania decisions continue to declare, however, that employment restrictions are
to be strictly construed against the employer because they contravene
5. The earliest cases were decided against the economic background of a
chronic shortage of skilled workers in England, the result of a virulent epidemic during the fourteenth century. All restrictive covenants, therefore, were held void. This
policy carried over into the early seventeenth century when grants of trading privileges by the sovereign caused widespread public indignation that broadened into a dislike for all restraints on free trade. See The Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, pl. 26

(1415).
6. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 331, 314 A.2d 279, 281
(1974) (Jones, C.J., concurring). See generally Carpenter, Validity of Contracts
Not To Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244 (1928).
7. Henschke v. Moore, 257 Pa. 196, 101 A. 308 (1917); Pittsburgh Stove &
Range Co. v. Pittsburgh Stove Co., 208 Pa. 37, 57 A. 77 (1904); Cooper v. Edebum,
198 Pa. 229, 47 A. 1116 (1901); Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa. 285, 37 A. 811 (1897);
Patterson v. Glassmire, 166 Pa. 230, 31 A. 40 (1895); Kelso v. Reid, 145 Pa. 606,
23 A. 323 (1892); Appeal of Harkinson, 78 Pa. 196 (1875); Appeal of McClurg,
58 Pa. 51 (1868); Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Pa. 194 (1867); Keeler v. Taylor, 53
Pa. 467 (1866). The doctrine that a contract in general restraint of trade is void
as against public policy rests on two principal grounds: (1) the injury to the public
caused by the elimination of the restricted party's industry, and (2) the injury to the
party precluded by contract from pursuing his occupation and, thus, prevented from
supporting himself and his family. Oregon Steam Nay. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 64, 66 (1873).
8. Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. 288, 59 A.
1088 (1904).
9. Henschke v. Moore, 257 Pa. 196, 200, 101 A. 308, 309 (1917).
10. Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. 288, 59 A.
1088 (1904).
11. Henschke v. Moore, 257 Pa. 196, 200, 101 A. 308, 309 (1917).
12. This position has been adopted by Pennsylvania through the adoption of
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 516(f) (1932):
The following bargains do not impose unreasonable restraint of trade unless effecting, or forming part of a plan to effect, a monopoly:
(f) A bargain by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his
employer or principal, during the term of employment or agency, or thereafter, within such territory and during such time as may be reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer or principal, without imposing
undue hardship on the employee or agent.
13. Henschke v. Moore, 257 Pa. 196, 200-01, 101 A. 308, 309 (1917); Monon-

694

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

the common-law concept of free competition. 4 To be enforceable, a
restrictive covenant must satisfy several requirements.' 5 It must be
ancillary to a contract of employment. 6 It also must be contained in
a valid contract and supported by adequate consideration. 1 7 The
restraint must be reasonably limited in duration and scope, necessary
for the protection of the employer, and not an undue hardship on the
employee.' 8 Finally, while in the course of his employment, the
employee must receive some specialized training or develop close
personal contacts with the customers of the employer.' 9 Although
courts often treat these requirements as separate and distinct, they are
closely interrelated and failure to satisfy one will often be a failure of
another.20
Ancillary to an Employment Contract

A.

It has long been the common-law rule that contracts in restraint
of trade made independently of a contract of employment or sale of a
business are void as against public policy regardless of the consideration exchanged therein. 2 ' Judge Taft, later the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, aptly stated the rule in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.:22
Th[e] very statement of the rule implies that the contract must
be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covenant
gahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. 288, 293, 59 A. 1088, 1089

(1904).
14. General Office Equip. Corp. v. Sampson, 90 Pitts. L.J. 179 (Pa. C.P. Alleg.
1941).
15. Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967); Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967); BarbLee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, 206 A.2d 59 (1965); Morgan's Home
Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957); Cleaver v. Lenhart,

182 Pa. 285, 37 A. 811 (1897); Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Pa. 194 (1867); Keller
v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866); Markson Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 499, 66 A.2d
218 (1949); see RESTATEMENT OF CoNIRc'rs § 515(e) (1932).

16.

See notes 21-43 and accompanying text infra.

17.
18.

See notes 44-71 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 72-113 and accompanying text infra.

19. See notes 114-128 and accompanying text infra.
20. See Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 451, 235
A.2d 612, 619 (1962). For example, failure of consideration will often cause the
restriction to fail as not ancillary to the taking of employment. See notes 28-33 and
accompanying text infra.
21. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 331, 314 A.2d 279, 282

(1974)

(Jones, C.J., concurring); Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427

Pa. 439, 447, 235 A.2d 612, 617 (1967); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci,
390 Pa. 618, 627, 136 A.2d 838, 845 (1957).

22. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 212 (1899).

in restraint is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted only
to protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the execution of the contract or employment of its fruits, he may suffer
from the unrestrained competition of the other. .

.

.But where

the sole object of both parties... is merely to restrain competition, . . . it would seem that there [is] nothing to justify or excuse the restraint . . . . There is in such contracts no main

lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is permitted,
. . .but the sole object is to restrain trade in order to avoid
it has always been the policy of the comthe competition which
23
mon law to foster.
Although the covenant not to compete must be ancillary to a
contract of employment, 24 it need not be executed simultaneously
with the initial taking of employment.2 5 In Jacobson & Co. v.
InternationalEnvironment Corp.2 a restrictive covenant was executed two years after Kily accepted employment and was supported by
adequate consideration. Kily sought to invalidate the restriction,
claiming that it was not ancillary to his initial assumption of employment. The court found some merit in Kily's contention that an
employee changes his position and an employer acquires leverage
after the commencement of employment, but stated that usually no
need exists to restrict competition from one hired as a novice. Only
when a novice has developed expertise that could injure his employer
if released competitively is the protection of a restrictive covenant
desirable. The court concluded that it is "far better to allow the
parties themselves, when they feel the employee's degree of skill
2 7
warrants it, to decide when to insert a restrictive covenant. 1
Pennsylvania courts have strictly construed the taking of employment.2 8 Any hiatus between the execution of an employment
contract or an agreement on its terms and the imposition of a restric29
tive covenant without a corresponding benefit or change in status
23. Id. at 282-83 (emphasis added).
24. Cases cited note 15 supra; A.B.L. Liquidating Co. v. McCabe, 24 Bucks
109 (Pa. C.P. 1973); Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 64 Berks 186 (Pa. C.P.
1972); Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assist. Agency v. Layton, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 270
(C.P. Dauph. 1972); Toensmeier v. Olsen, 85 York 154 (Pa. C.P. 1971); Cavanaugh
v. U.S. Career Recruiters, Inc., 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 690 (C.P. Phila. 1970); L.J. Balfour
Co. v. Burke, 118 Pitts. L.J. 372 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1970); Coyne Indus. Laundry, Inc.
v. Shouck, 84 York 57 (Pa. C.P. 1970); Protect Alarms, Inc. v. Ernst, 48 Pa. D.
& C.2d 413 (C.P. Leh. 1969); National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Snyder, 34 Pa. D.
& C.2d 533 (C.P. Phila. 1964); Randall v. Quetsch, 44 Wash. 204 (Pa. C.P. 1964);
W.N.O.W., Inc. v. Barry, 77 York 174, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 514 (C.P. 1963); Jack
Tratenberg, Inc. v. Komoroff, 87 Pa. D. & C. 1 (C.P. Phila. 1951).
25. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 332, 314 A.2d 279, 282
(1974) (Jones, C.J., concurring); Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427
Pa. 439, 449-50, 235 A.2d 612, 618 (1967); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v.
Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 629, 136 A.2d 838, 845 (1957).
26. 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967).
27. Id. at 450, 235 A.2d at 618.
28. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v.Gottus,455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974).
29. Id.; Jacobson & Co. v.International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d
612 (1967).

696

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

for the employee will render the restrictive covenant void as not
ancillary to employment 0 and not supported by adequate consideration.3 '
Because of the five-month delay between the oral agreement to
employ defendant and the imposition of a restrictive covenant, the
3
Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Markson Brothers v. Redick 2
refused to enforce the restraint in the absence of a beneficial change
in defendant's employment status. In Beneficial Finance Co. v.
Becker,"8 however, the contract containing the restrictive covenant

was signed by the employee two days after commencing work and
was not binding until nine days later when it was accepted by the
Beneficial Management Corporation in Newark, New Jersey. Nevertheless, the court held the contract ancillary to the taking of employment because a field supervisor had approved it for Becker's signature
on the day he started to work. Markson and Becker are easily
distinguished. In the latter case the contract was prepared on the
employee's first day of work while in the former an entirely separate
attempt was made by the employer to impose a covenant not anticipated by the employee when he accepted employment.
Another requirement is that of a regular employment relationship. 34 In Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci 35 plaintiff
company purchased the assets of another company by which defend30. Compare Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 242
(1967) (twelve-year delay), with Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Becker, 422 Pa. 531, 222
A.2d 873 (1966). A hiatus between commencement of employment and imposition
of a restrictive covenant also rendered the covenant void in Burroughs Corp. v.
Cimakasky, 346 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (four-year delay); George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, - Pa. -, 347 A.2d 311 (1975) (two-week delay); Maintenance
Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974) (one-year delay); Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960) (three-year delay);
Markson Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 499, 66 A.2d 218 (1949) (five-month delay); W.N.O.W., Inc. v. Barry, 77 York 174, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 514 (C.P. 1963)
(seven-day delay).
31. Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 449, 235 A.2d
612, 619 (1967). The issues of ancillary to the taking of employment and adequate
consideration are intertwined. This is illustrated by the disagreement among the Justices in George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, - Pa. -, 347 A.2d 311 (1975). Justice
Nix felt the disputed covenant was invalid because it was not supported by adequate
consideration while Chief Justice Jones and Justice Roberts felt it was invalid because
it was not ancillary to the taking of employment.
32. 164 Pa. Super. 499, 66 A.2d 218 (1949).
33. 422 Pa. 531, 222 A.2d 873 (1966).
34. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 212 (1899); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618,
136 A.2d 838 (1957).
35. 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957).

ants had been employed. At an organizational meeting defendants
were retained provisionally by the new employer. Four weeks later,
upon plaintiff's offer of regular employment, defendants executed
contracts containing restrictive covenants. In a subsequent suit on
these covenants the court rejected defendants' contention that they
were not ancillary to the taking of employment because the restrictions were not imposed at the time of provisional employment. Although the court did not explain its holding, no persuasive reason
exists to allow an employer to impose restrictive covenants on employees hired provisionally. These employees will not learn the employer's business, are hired for only a short time, are unimportant to
the business operation, and cannot be considered a competitive threat
to the employer upon expiration of their employment term. For these
reasons Pennsylvania courts have adhered consistently to the rule. that
"[a]s long as the restrictive covenants are an auxiliary part of the
taking of regular employment and not an after-thought to impose
additional restrictions on the unsuspecting employee, a contract of
employment containing such covenants is. . . enforceable."3 6'
Pennsylvania case law also requires that employment contracts
containing restrictive covenants be executed by individual employees
or their collective bargaining representative. In Berks Packing Co. v.
Landis 7 defendant employee was a member of a union that through
collective bargaining had agreed to a contract containing a restrictive
covenant. The covenant prohibited member employees from selling
meat products in competition with the employer for two years after
leaving his employment. In an action to enforce the covenant,
Landis asserted that the union was without authority under the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act" to bargain on this subject. This
Act provides that the union shall be the representative "for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment or other conditions of employment."3 9 The
court rejected Landis' argument, holding that the restrictive covenant
was a condition of employment.4" One persuasive element may have
been that both the union and the employer considered the restriction
a proper subject for the contract. Additionally, Landis was held to
41
have sufficient actual or constructive knowledge of the covenant.
Thus, the employment contract was ancillary to the taking of employ36. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Becker, 422 Pa. 531, 536, 222 A.2d 873, 876 (1966)
(emphasis added).
37. 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 395 (C.P. Berks 1968).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.1-.13 (1964).
39. Id. at § 211.7(a).
40. 47 Pa. D. & C.2d at 399.
41. Id.
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ment and not an afterthought designed to impose additional restrictions on an unsuspecting employee.4 2
In summary, for a restrictive covenant to be found ancillary to
the taking of employment, the restriction must be contained in a
contract for regular employment at the time the contract is agreed to
by the employee or his union. Any hiatus between commencement
of employment and imposition of the covenant without additional
consideration43 will render the covenant void.
B.

Supported by Adequate Consideration

Another prerequisite for enforcement of a restrictive covenant is
a valid contract. An offer and an acceptance, both established by the
employment relationship," must exist as well as consideration to
support the covenant. 45 The first of two types of consideration that
will support a restrictive covenant is illustrated by an initial employment contract. The consideration is the employment relationship itself because none existed previously.46 The employee agrees that in
return
for the job he will abide by the terms of employment offered
47
hiino

On the other hand, when a restrictive covenant is added to an
existing employment relationship, regardless of whether the original
contract was oral and terminable at will 4 or oral and binding for a
specified term, 49 it is enforceable only if the employee receives a
corresponding benefit or change in status.5 0 The employee must be
42. Id.; see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
43. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
44. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 339, 314 A.2d 279, 285
(1974) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
45. George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, Pa. -,
-,
347 A.2d 311, 314
(1975); Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 330, 314 A.2d 279, 285
(1974).
46. Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, 206 A.2d 59 (1965).
47. Id. at 225, 206 A.2d at 61.
48. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974);
Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967);
Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960); Markson Bros.
v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 499, 66 A.2d 218 (1949).
49. W.N.O.W., Inc. v. Barry, 77 York 174, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 514 (C.P. 1963).
50. Burroughs Corp. v. Cimakasky, 346 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (applying Pennsylvania law); Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 333, 314
A.2d 279, 282 (1974) (Jones, C.J., concurring); Jacobson & Co. v. International
Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 449, 235 A.2d 612, 618 (1967); Capital Bakers, Inc. v.
Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967); Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225
A.2d 670 (1967); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d
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in a better position after the imposition of the restraint than he was
before.5 1 Such a beneficial change was apparent in Jacobson & Co. v.
International Environment Corp.5 2 The employee had been hired
under an oral contract in 1957 that provided for a ten thousand dollar
salary and contained no restrictive covenant. In 1959 the employee
signed a written contract that contained a covenant not to compete
with his employer for two years following termination of his employment. The 1959 contract, however, also changed the employee's
compensation to a nine thousand dollar salary plus a share of the
profits. The employee's earnings increased dramatically to a figure
in excess of twenty-four thousand dollars in 1963. The modified
compensation scheme was found to be adequate consideration for
execution of the restrictive covenant.
Because of the inherently economic nature of the employeeemployer relationship, courts search for some economic benefit to the
employee when asked to enforce a restrictive covenant. In Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel5" the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that an employer's assumption of unemployment and social security taxes and contributions to an employee's pension plan constituted
adequate consideration, even though the employee's termination of
employment before the expiration of two years would have involved a
forfeiture of pension rights. Adequate consideration has been found
in the guaranty of an employee's stock option when no such guaranty
was available before.54 Similarly, a change from a noncommission
compensation scheme to one including commissions and expense
money has been held to be legally sufficient consideration. 5 Finally,
in Fatzinger v. DeLong5 6 sufficient economic benefit was found in a
deferred cash payment of five hundred dollars to the employee. A
gift of five shares of the corporation's stock was made by the employer to certain employees, subject to the condition that the stock be
transferred back to the employer to be held in trust by him for five
years. Upon termination of his employment an employee would
receive five hundred dollars for his shares.
768 (1965); Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, 206 A.2d 59 (1965);
Alabama Binder & Chem. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 410 Pa. 214,
189 A.2d 180 (1963); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136
A.2d 838 (1957); Ross v. Houck, 184 Pa. Super. 448, 136 A.2d 160 (1957); Markson
Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 199, 66 A.2d 218 (1949).
51. Markson Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 199, 66 A.2d 218 (1949).
52. 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967). The court also noted that a covenant's

application to only voluntary terminations of employment and not dismissals will not
affect the restriction's enforceability. Id. at 453, 235 A.2d at 620.
53. 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960).

54.

Papercraft Corp. v. Prescher, 121 Pitts. L.J. 71 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1972).

55.
56.

M.S. Jacobs & Assoc., Inc. v. Duffley, 452 Pa. 143, 303 A.2d 921 (1973).
10 Pa. D. & C.2d 53 (C.P. Leh. 1956).
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Monetary benefit has been conspicuously absent from cases in
which the courts have failed to find adequate consideration to support
the subsequent imposition of a restrictive covenant. 57 For example,
the addition of a provision requiring the employer to give notice
before dismissing an employee is not in itself adequate consideration.58 In Jack Tratenberg, Inc. v. Komorof, 59 however, the court
held that an agreement by the employer not to discharge without
fifteen days' notice coupled with a two-dollar increase in car allowance was sufficient consideration to support a covenant prohibiting
the employee from soliciting his employer's trade for six months after
termination of his employment.60
A controversial issue is whether continued employment is adequate consideration for imposition of a restrictive covenant in a
written contract for an indefinite term of employment when the initial
contract contained no restrictive covenant and was oral and terminable at will. Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus6 ' illustrates the
Pennsylvania position that continued employment alone is not adequate consideration. 62 Gottus was initially hired in 1968 pursuant to
an oral contract terminable at will. On April 29, 1969, the parties
entered into a written employment contract that included a covenant
not to compete. Justice Pomeroy considered and rejected the argu57. See George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, - Pa. -, 347 A.2d 311 (1975).
A contract that is binding solely by reason of its being under seal will not be specifically enforced unless some performance constituting a fair exchange is a condition
of defendant's duty. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Snyder, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d
533, 539 (C.P. Phila. 1964). Incorporation of the employer's business without other
change does not abrogate contracts of employment or alter the parties' liability.
Seligman & Latz v. Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 164, 114 A.2d 672, 673 (1955).
58. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 330 n.1, 314 A.2d 279, 281
n.1 (1974) (fifteen days); Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d
292 (1967) (thirty days); Markson Bros. v. Redick, 164 Pa. Super. 499, 66 A.2d 218
(1949) (fifteen days). This was particularly true in Maintenance. The notice provision was illusory because the company could dispense with it at its virtually unlimited discretion.
59. 87 Pa. D. & C. 1 (C.P. Phila. 1951).
60. Id. at 8.
61. 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974).
62. Id. at 334-35, 314 A.2d at 283; see George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, Pa. -, -, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (1975); National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Snyder,
34 Pa. D. & C.2d 533 (C.P. Phila. 1964); W.N.O.W., Inc. v. Barry, 77 York 174,
32 Pa. D. & C.2d 514 (C.P. 1963); Voss Mach. Co. v. Norris, 82 Pa. D. & C. 368
(C.P. Alleg. 1952); Consolidated Home Furn. Co. v. Getson, 80 Pa. D. & C. 488
Contra, Cundiff v. Ertl, 47 Dauph. 440 (Pa. C.P. 1939)
(C.P. Phila. 1951).
Cundif is the only Pennsylvania case that holds that continued employment is sufficient consideration for a written contract containing a restrictive covenant executed
after an initial oral contract without such a covenant. This case, although never specifically overruled, is contrary to the great weight of authority supra.

ment that since the initial contract was terminable at will, continued
employment should be adequate consideration for the subsequent
written contract. 63 Enforcement of a restrictive covenant in a Gottus
situation could produce highly inequitable results. Most of the burdens an employer can impose, such as decreased compensation, longer hours, or increased duties, can be swiftly avoided by the employee
if his employment contract is terminable at the will of either party. If,
on the other hand, a contract remains terminable at will, but is
augmented by a restrictive covenant supported only by formalization
of the agreement into a writing,6 4 the employee is saddled with a
burden of which he cannot relieve himself by terminating his employment. In fact, an employee faced with the possibility of discharge
may find it difficult to reject his employer's demand for a covenant.
Yet, no change in the employee's status would occur, no financial
benefit would exist, and no fair exchange for the restrictive covenant
would have been made.6 Therefore, a restrictive covenant based on
such inadequate consideration falls far short of the requirements for
enforceability established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 6
This rule of law, however, is not without dissenters.
If a restrictive covenant would be valid at the time an employee
is first employed, I fail to see any logic to the prohibition against
an employer requesting the same covenant subsequent to the
employee's initial employment as a condition of continuing the
employment [as long] as there is no claim... that the employee
had an oral contract of employment for a specified term which
was being altered or breached. . . The question is whether
consideration has been given since there was a pre-existing
oral contract of employment which was terminable at will. In
such circumstances the employee is not guaranteed continuing
employment nor is the employer guaranteed the continued services of the employee. Either party may require any change in
the terms of employment as a condition for continuing the employment relationship. The continued employment is the con67
sideration supporting any new term requested by either party.
Justice Manderino is correct in his assertion that the employer's
63. 455 Pa. at 336, 314 A.2d at 284 (concurring opinion).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
67. Maintenance Spec., Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 337, 314 A.2d 279, 28485 (1974) (Manderino & Roberts, JJ., dissenting). Justice Manderino also stated
that the result would be different if the preexisting contract, oral or written, had not
been terminable at will.
Where the contract sets a definite term, were one party to increase the duty
of the other without correspondingly giving a benefit to that party, the increased duty would not be enforceable. This is so because the consideration
for the increased duty cannot be the continuing employment since both
parties were already bound to continue the employment relationship for the
term specified in the contract.
Id. at 339-40, 314 A.2d at 286.
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interests are identical in both situations. 68 The majority view, however, which recognizes the employer's superior bargaining position
after employment is commenced and the extremely inequitable results
that could follow adoption of the minority position,6 9 is the enlightened approach.70
For a restrictive covenant to be supported by adequate consideration in Pennsylvania, financial benefit must inure to the restricted
employee either in the form of initial employment or, if the contract is

executed subsequent to initial employment, by additional compensation. Pennsylvania is unlikely to recognize any abstract benefits,
such as a promotion without a salary increase, as adequate consideration for a covenant not to compete. 71 Simply stated, the consideration must be measurable in dollars and cents.
C.

Reasonable in Duration and GeographicalScope; Necessary for
the Employer's Protection; Free from Undue Hardship on the
Employee
Restrictive covenants in employment contracts are subject to
more stringent standards of reasonableness 72 than are those contained
in contracts for the sale of a business. 78 Employment covenants
68. Id. at 342, 314 A.2d at 287.
69. A number of jurisdictions have held continued employment to be sufficient
consideration for a subsequent restrictive covenant. Tarrington Creamery v. Davenport, 126 Conn. 515, 12 A.2d 780 (1940); Raessler v. Burwell, 119 Conn. 289, 176
A. 126 (1934); Credit Rating Serv. v. Charlesworth, 126 N.J. Eq. 360, 8 A.2d 847
(1939); McAnally v. Person, 57 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Similar covenants have been upheld in some cases without a discussion of consideration. City Ice
& Fuel Co. v. McKee, 57 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. App. 1933); City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Snell,
57 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. App. 1933); Sarco Co. v. Gulliver, 3 N.J. Misc. 641, 129 A. 399
(1925); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y.S.
325 (1919); Stover v. Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co., 164 App. Div. 155, 149 N.Y.S.
650 (1914).
70. See Consolidated Home Furn. Co. v. Getson, 80 Pa. D. & C. 488 (C.P.
Phila. 1951) (new union contract is same as continued employment and alone is not
adequate consideration).
71. In George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, - Pa. -, 347 A.2d 311 (1975),
the supreme court held that nominal consideration of one dollar, absent other factors,
is not adequate consideration.
72. Cases cited note 15 supra; Boldt Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Wallace, 56 Erie
93 (Pa. C.P. 1973); H. & R. Block v. Goss, 13 Lyc. 5 (Pa. C.P. 1972); L.G. Balfour
Co. v. Burke, 118 Pitts. L.J. 372 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1970); Chambersburg Broadcasting
Co. v. Foreman, 14 Cumb. 100 (Pa. C.P. Frank 1962); O'Reilly & White, Inc.
v. Ferguson, 10 Chest. 556 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Jacobson & Co., Inc. v. Strauss, 77
Montg. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1960); Morefield v. Hassman, 74 Dauph. 241 (Pa. C.P. 1959);
Penguin Ice Cream v. Shiner, 27 Leh. 342 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Keystone Sign Co. v.
Trainor, 67 York 189 (Pa. C.P. 1954); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 515(e), 516
(f) (1932).
73. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 631-32, 136 A.2d

impose a greater hardship on an employee than upon a similarly
restricted seller of a business."4 The serious impediment an employee
may face in his attempt to support himself and his family7 5 and the
community's deprivation of the employee's services and competition7"
are major concerns of the courts in construing covenants not to

compete. Necessarily, reasonableness is a question of fact.77
1. Enforcement of the Restrictive Covenant as Written.-The
recent case of Bettinger v. Carl Berke Associates, Inc.7 illustrates the
Pennsylvania approach to limitations on a restrictive covenant's duration and geographical scope. A rebuttable presumption exists that
these restraints are legal. An employee relying on the defense of
illegality, therefore, has the burden of showing unreasonableness of
undue hardship7 9 in a suit by the employer to enforce a covenant.8 0 If
the employee fails to meet this burden, the restraint will be enforced."' The covenant in Bettinger prevented the ex-employee from
competing with his former employer in the temporary-help business
for one year within the city limits of Philadelphia. Among a number
of considerations in determining reasonableness, the court found of
significant importance the nature of the business involved in the
restriction.8 2 Because of the close personal contact between employees and customers, an ex-employee allowed to compete could siphon
off a substantial number of his former employer's customers. Similarly, in other cases involving personal contact, the courts have generally
838, 846 (1957); see

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515(b), comment b at 989
(1932).
74. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Drayton, 378 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 631-32, 136 A.2d 838,
846 (1957).
75. Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 454, 235 A.2d
612, 621 (1967).
76. Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960); HanIon v. Morrissey, 30 North. 282, 58 Pa. D. & C. 133 (C.P. 1946).
77. Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967); see Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, - Pa. -, 351 A.2d 207 (1976).
78. 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974).
79. Seligman & Latz v. Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 114 A.2d 672 (1955); Plunkett
Chem. Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa. 513, 95 A.2d 925 (1953); Harris Calorific Co. v.
Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 29 A.2d 64 (1942); Sklaroff v. Sklaroff, 263 Pa. 421, 106 A.
793 (1919); Harbison-Walker Refrac. Co. v. Stanton, 227 Pa. 55, 75 A. 988 (1910).
80. The suit must be timely. In Greencastle Livestock Mkt., Inc. v. Knauff,
3 Pa. D. & C.2d 333 (C.P. Frank. 1951), the employer knew that defendant had
breached, yet conducted business with him for two years. Plaintiff was estopped by
waiver from enforcing the covenant and his delay of three years in bringing suit constituted laches.
81. Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 468, 29 A.2d 64, 67 (1948);
see Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 103, 314 A.2d 296, 298 (1974).
82. Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 104, 314 A.2d 296, 298
(1974); Standard Print. Co. v. Procopio, 37 North. 60 (Pa. C.P. 1964); Hanlon v.
Morrissey, 30 North. 282, 58 Pa. D. & C. 133 (C.P. 1946); Mascaro v. Ricci, 56
Montg. 378 (Pa. C.P. 1940).
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upheld restrictions on competition as necessary to protect the employ83

er.

A court also will consider the effect of the restriction's enforcement on the employee.8 4 If the scope or duration of the covenant is
so excessive that the employee is deprived of the opportunity to make
a living or support his family, the restraint is prima facie unreasonable and unenforceable. 8" If enforcement will not prevent the employee from earning a living in areas with which he is familiar, however,
the restraint will be deemed reasonable.8 6 In Bettinger, despite
enforcement, the employee was free to pursue several familiar sales
areas, and therefore, no undue hardship was proven.
Finally and most importantly, the restrictions must be capable of
precise delineation by a court. When -both the duration and geographical area are stated specifically in the covenant, courts have
shown a greater willingness to uphold it. 87 The employee in Bettin83. Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 104, 314 A.2d 296, 298
(1974); see Jacobson & Co. v. International .Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967). But see notes 114-128 and accompanying text infra.
84. Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 104, 314 A.2d 296, 298
(1974).
85. See, e.g., Trilog Assoc., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287
(1974).
86. Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 104, 314 A.2d 296, 298
(1974).
87. The courts have held the following restrictions reasonable although the covenant may have been invalidated for other reasons: Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner,
- Pa. -, 351 A.2d 207 (1976) (three years, thirty miles); Maintenance Spec., Inc.
v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 329, 314 A.2d 279 (1974) (two years, company territory); Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974) (two years, fifty
miles); Jacobson & Co. v. 'International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967) (two years, area one salesman could cover); Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23,
225 A.2d 670 (1967) (three years, six air miles); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Becker, 422
Pa. 531, 222 A.2d 873 (1966) (three years); Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot,
416 Pa. 222, 206 A.2d 59 (1965) (five years, entire state); Pennsylvania Funds
Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960) (two years, entire state); Seligman
& Latz v. Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 114 A.2d 672 (1955) (one year, one mile); Harbison-Walker Refrac. Co. v. Stanton, 227 Pa. 55, 75 A. 988 (1910) (fifteen years, five
states); Ross v. Houck, 184 Pa. Super. 448, 136 A.2d 160 (1957) (five years, three
miles); Papercraft Co. v. Prescher, 121 Pitts. L.J. 71 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1972) (three
years); L.G. Balfour Co. v. Burkes, 118 Pitts. L.J. 372 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1970) (two
years, employee's former sales territory); W.G.A.L., Inc. v. Wolf, 83 York 45 (Pa.
C.P. 1969) (one year, thirty-five miles); Strayer-Beitzel of York, Inc. v. Mehl, 82
York 133 (Pa. C.P. 1968) (five years, entire state); Berks Packing Co. v. Landis,
47 Pa. D. & C.2d 395 (C.P. Berks 1968) (two years, former service territory); Sales
Consult., Inc. v. Pollock, 116 Pitts. L.J. 118 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1967) (nine months, city
of Pittsburgh); Chambersburg Broadcasting Co. v. Foreman, 14 Cumb. 100 (Pa. C.P.
Frank 1962) (three years, fifteen miles); Yetter v. Dunn, 78 Montg. 16 (Pa.
C.P. 1961) (one year, three miles); Fatzinger v. DeLong, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 53 (C.P.
Leh. 1957) (three years, twenty-five miles); Amish Village, Inc. v. Neuber, 75 Pa.

ger was precluded for one year from competing with his former
employer within the city of Philadelphia. The court probably reasoned that the one-year limitation was the minimum duration necessary to afford any actual protection to the employer and that the
geographical scope of the restraint was entirely reasonable since it
afforded the employee an opportunity to do business in the suburbs.
2. Reasonable Limits Found by Implication.-If a covenant

has no time limitation but encompasses a limited geographical area,
the agreement is prima facie valid' s and the burden is still upon the
party asserting illegality to prove the restraint's unreasonableness.8 9
This is also true when a restriction is limited in time but unlimited in
scope.90 If a restrictive covenant is limited in neither duration nor
scope, however, the overwhelming weight of authority in Pennsylvania holds that the restraint is void. 9
Enforcement is impossible
because no accurate delineation of the restriction is possible. No
standards exist to determine if a breach has occurred or to evaluate
the employer's interest. Undoubtedly an undue hardship is placed on
the ex-employee by an open-ended restrictive covenant. 92 Absent
limits allowing a court to measure reasonableness, enforcement
should be withheld in every case.
D. & C. 323 (C.P. Lanc. 1950) (five years, same county); Berkowitz v. Ronay, 31
Wash. 20 (Pa. C.P. 1950) (one year, fifty miles); Niedland v. Kulka, 64 Pa. D. &
C. 418 (C.P. Montg. 1948) (two years, twenty-five miles); Easton Laundries v.
Smith, 26 North. 324 (Pa. C.P. 1938) (one year, former territory); Grand Union
Tea Co. v. Puras, 23 Lack. 278 (Pa. C.P. 1922) (six months, former territory). But
see Protect Alarms, Inc. v. Ernst, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (C.P. Leh. 1969) (three
years, thirty miles held unreasonable); Histand v. Nagorski, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 157
(C.P. Bucks 1963) (ten years held unreasonable); Musser v. Bummer, 54 Lanc. 227
(Pa. C.P. 1954) (five years held unreasonable); Lewis v. Wimberly, 76 Pitts. L.J.
513 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1928) (two years, company's business territory held unreasonable).
88. Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 29 A.2d 64 (1942); Sklaroff
v. Sklaroff, 263 Pa. 421, 106 A. 793 (1919); Hobensack v. McLean, 86 Pa. D. &
C. 482 (C.P. Bucks 1953); Hanlon v. Morrissey, 30 North. 282, 58 Pa. D. & C.
133 (C.P. 1946); Fritz v. Bitler, 26 Schuy. 1 (Pa. C.P. 1928).
89. Sklaroff v. Sklaroff, 263 Pa. 421, 425, 106 A. 793, 794 (1919).
90. When an agreement contains no limitation on the area covered or, alternatively, contains no time limitation, courts will sustain the contract if in view of the
circumstances it can be given a reasonable interpretation. Seligman & Latz v.
Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 165, 114 A.2d 672, 674 (1955); see Trilog Assoc., Inc. v.
Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 257, 314 A.2d 287, 295 (1974) (Eagen, J., concurring);
Plunkett Chem. Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa. 513, 516, 95 A.2d 925, 926 (1953); Harris
Calorific Co. v. Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 469, 29 A.2d 64, 67 (1942). Compare F.G.
Okie, Inc. v. Attaway, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 173 (C.P. Montg. 1962), with Greystone
Uphol. Corp. v. Lehigh Shops, Inc., 30 Leh. 106 (Pa. C.P. 1962). See also 14 S.
WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1639 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
91. Reading Aviation Serv. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, 491, 311 A.2d 628, 630
(1973); Henschke v. Moore, 257 Pa. 196, 101 A. 308 (1917); Pittsburgh Brass Co.
v. Adler, 2 Mona. 235 (Pa. 1889); Taylor v. Saurman, 110 Pa. 3, I.A. 40 (1885);
Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866).
Contra, Brajkovic v. Abrashoff, 15 Dauph.
10 (Pa. C.P. 1911).
92. Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, 492, 311 A.2d 628,
630 (1973). For text of the restriction see note 108 infra.
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98
The restrictive covenant in Trilog Associates, Inc. v. Famularo,
for example, which was agreed upon in 1967, prohibited employee
Famularo from "developing or assisting in the development or exploitation of any shareholders' record system on his account or for
any other party" until March 2, 1972. 91 Employees Marabella and
Gawry were similarly prohibited
from coming under the employ of any customer or client of
Trilog or of any business or individual with which the employee
had come into contact or acquaintance through his employment
with Trilog for a period of two years after leaving the employ of
Trilog. 95
The court held both restrictions void because they were neither
limited in their territorial application nor capable of reasonable interpretation. A reasonable scope was impossible to discern in the
restraint on Famularo. Although the restraint was limited in time,
the employee met his burden of showing unreasonableness. 9 6 He was
precluded from practicing his profession anywhere for anyone. This
covenant was patently oppressive because it had no relationship to
any valid interest of the former employer.17 The same reasoning was
applied to invalidate the covenants executed by Marabella and Gawry. They were prevented from entering into the employ of any
competitor of Trilog in any capacity and in any place. A covenant
must cover only employment related to the work the ex-employee
performed for his former employer.9 8

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded in Henschke v.
Moore99 that a covenant that was unlimited in time and attempted to
encompass the entire United States was an unreasonable restraint of
trade. At the time the distinction between general and partial restraints of trade was based largely on geographical considerations. 00
93. 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
94. Id. at 248, 314 A.2d at 291.
95. Id. at 253-54, 314 A.2d at 293.
96. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
97. 455 Pa. at 254, 314 A.2d at 293; see Reading Aviation Serv. v. Bertolet,
454 Pa. 488, 311 A.2d 628 (1973); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Becker, 422 Pa. 531, 534
n.3, 222 A.2d 873, 875 n.3 (1966).
98. Trilog Assoc., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 255, 314 A.2d 287, 294
(1974). Justice Manderino illustrated the extensive nature of the restriction:
It bars Marabella and Gawry from accepting employment as bartenders in
Ireland from the father of the sister-in-law of the aunt of the elevator operator whom Marabella and Gawry happen to meet in a bar in Scranton while
on Trilog's business.
Id. at 256, 314 A.2d at 294.
99. 257 Pa. 196, 101 A. 308 (1917).

100.

See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.

Thus, for many years Henschke stood for the proposition that a
restrictive covenant that encompassed the entire country was unreasonable as a matter of law. The same court reversed itself, however,
in 1963 in Alabama Binder & Chemical Corp. v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.10 1 The restrictive covenant in Alabama Binder
had a five-year duration and precluded the employee from associating
with any of his former employer's competitors. Alabama Binder had
a limited number of competitors in the binder and plasticizer market,
all of which distributed their products nationwide. Thus, the restriction had a direct, reasonable relationship to a valid interest of the
employer and was enforceable.
In summary, no rigid test of the reasonableness of restrictive
covenants exists. A case-by-case analysis is necessary, in which, inter
alia, the character of the business involved and the relative needs of
the employer and employee are important. So long as a restrictive
covenant contains reasonable limits, either express or implied, on its
duration and geographical scope, it will be enforced.
3. Partial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants.-A restrictive covenant found excessive in geographical scope or duration can
be partially enforced. Pennsylvania courts will limit the restriction to
reasonable geographical and temporal boundaries according to the
realities of the situation" 2 if the limitations are inherently divisible.'
Where a county, or city or borough is named as a limit, and an
unreasonable extent of territory in addition is also named, the
covenant is divisible, and may
0 4 be valid as to the particular place
which is a reasonable limit.'

This capacity to modify contract terms has been called by Justice
101. 410 Pa. 214, 189 A.2d 180 (1963).
102. Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, 225, 206 A.2d 59, 60
(1965).
103. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Drayton, 378 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, - Pa. -, 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Bettinger v. Carl
Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974); Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie
Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768 (1965); Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v.
Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, 206 A.2d 59 (1965); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci,
390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957); Seligman & Latz v. Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 104
A.2d 672 (1955); Plunkett Chem. Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa. 513, 95 A.2d 925 (1953);
Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 29 A.2d 64 (1943); Monongahela River
Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. 288, 59 A. 1088 (1904); Couchara v.
Wonland, 71 Montg. 367 (Pa. C.P. 1955); see RESTATEMENT OF COrRACTS §§ 515
(a)-(b), 518 (1932).
Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain has added to
it a promise in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable
unless the entire agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if
full performance of a promise indivisible in terms, would involve unreasonable restraint, the promise is illegal and is not enforceable even for so much
of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
Id. at § 518.
104. Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. 579, 590, 6 A. 251, 253 (1886).

Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Musmanno "the unique virtue of equity.., to rehabilitate wrecked
principles." 10 5
In Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot'0 6 the restrictive covenant contained a five-year prohibition against competition with the
employer in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. A lower
court's modification of the geographical scope to Pennsylvania was
affirmed by the supreme court. Because the bulk of the employer's
business was performed within Pennsylvania, restraining competition
within the Commonwealth was all that was reasonably necessary for
his protection. In Reading Aviation Service v. Bertolet, 0 7 however,
the court refused to enforce any part of an excessively broad restrictive covenant. 08 Justice Pomeroy, writing for the majority, relied on
the Restatement of Contracts'°9 to support the court's refusal to
modify the indivisible and open-ended restriction.
The objection to such a practice is that it tends to encourage
employers possessing superior bargaining power over that of
their employees . . .to insist upon unreasonable and excessive

restrictions secure in the knowledge that the promise may be upheld in part, if not in full." 0
The difference in these cases is the delineation of the restriction's
geographical scope in Barb-Lee. It contained distinct and, therefore,
divisible political and geographical areas, which enabled the court to
make a reasonable and practical modification. The covenant in
Reading Aviation, on the other hand, contained no limitations. Any
attempt to enforce part of the restriction would have required a
rewriting of the agreement.I"
105. Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 416 Pa. 222, 224, 206 A.2d 59, 60
(1965).
106. 416 Pa. 222, 206 A.2d 59 (1965); accord, Bahleda v. Hankison Corp., 228
Pa. Super. 153, 232 A.2d 121 (1974).
107. 454 Pa. 488, 311 A.2d 628 (1973).
108. The restrictive covenant read as follows:
In connection with my employment by you, I hereby agree that so long as
I am an officer, director, employee, or am otherwise active in your business,
I will not own any interest in, or engage in any way, directly or indirectly,
in any business competitive with you, or any of your subsidiaries, or solicit
or in any other manner or way assist any such competitive business after I
have voluntarily ceased to be an officer, director, employee or otherwise
active in your business or any of your subsidiaries.
109. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932); see note 103 supra.
110. 454 Pa. at 493, 311 A.2d at 630; see 14 S. WELLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1647c (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
111. In Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, - Pa. -, -,
351 A.2d 250, 257 (1976),
the court referred to the covenant in Reading Aviation:
This sort of gratuitous overbreadth militates against enforcement because it
indicates an intent to oppress the employee and/or to foster a monopoly

. The best example of the operation of the equitable tool of partial
enforcement is Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Drayton,112 in which
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania modified
both the duration and geographical limit of a restrictive covenant.
The covenant contained a ten-year prohibition against competition
with the employer, an insurance brokerage firm, within one hundred
miles of the city limits of Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and any
city in which Drayton had been employed within the three years
immediately preceding termination of employment. The court, while
noting that the restriction was reasonable and necessary at the time it
was executed some seven years earlier, felt compelled to employ a
different perspective in gauging its reasonableness at the time of
suit. 1 13 Drayton was fifty-two years old and, if the restriction had
been enforced for its entire ten-year duration, he probably would have
been too close to retirement age to start a new career. Judge Higginbotham also took notice that the insurance policies involved were
often renewed annually and that Drayton's business activity was quite
limited in the Boston area. To protect the employer's interests
without imposing an undue hardship on Drayton, the court modified
and partially enforced the restrictive covenant to prevent him from
competing for two years within one hundred miles of Philadelphia.
Although not free from controversy, the prerequisites of valid
restrictive covenants are clear. The restraints must be reasonable,
adequately delineated in geographical scope and duration, closely
related to a valid interest of the employer, and sufficiently clear to
allow partial enforcement by the judiciary.
D. Specialized Trainingand PersonalContacts
An employee often develops close personal contacts with his
employer's customers, some of whom will transfer their business to a
competing ex-employee. As a result, Pennslyvania courts for many
years consistently held that an employee need not receive any specialized training to allow enforcement of a restrictive covenant." 14 Presence or absence of specialized training was merely another fact to be
either of which is an illegitimate purpose. An employer who extracts a
covenant in furtherance of such a purpose comes to the court of equity with
unclean hands and is, therefore, not entitled to equitable enforcement of the
covenant.
112. 378 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
113. Id. at 831; the court in Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron adopted the same approach by determining the reasonableness of the restriction, as modified by the lower
court, as of the time of suit. Id. at -, 351 A.2d at 257.
114. Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974);
Jacobson & Co. v. International Envir. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967);
Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967); A.J. Cole & Co. v. Field, 95
Dauph. 454 (Pa. C.P. 1973); Lemoyne Sleeper Co. v. Bolger, 94 Dauph. 19 (Pa. C.P.
1971); Sales Consult., Inc. v. Pollock, 116 Pitts. L.J. 118 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1967). But

see Ginsberg v. Jones, 49 Del. 39 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
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considered by the court, not itself controlling."' For example, in
Jacobson & Co. v. InternationalEnvironment Corp. 1 6 the chancellor
found that the employee had received no special training from Jacobson or any insight into its business. The restrictive covenant was
enforced by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania without dissent,
however, because the "close personal contact of the sales representatives with prospective buyers was critical to the success of the business." 17
The solidity of this point of law, on the other hand, has been
undermined by Girard Investment Co. v. Bello."8 The requisite
personal contacts deemed so important in Jacobson were undisputed
in this case. Bello had been branch manager of one of plaintiff's
banks. Because of the personal nature of the business, Girard's
president admitted that borrowers tended to follow branch managers
when they moved. In fact, Bello testified that many of his loan
customers were drawn from his circle of friends and acquaintances.
Nevertheless, the supreme court, apparently rejecting prior case law,
refused to enforce the restrictive covenant because no evidence that
the employee had received specialized training or learned trade secrets
or that Girard had suffered undue hardship from Bello's cessation of
employment was introduced. 1 9
Construction of a passage in Morgan's Home Equipment Corp.
v. Martucci'2 0 is the key to the court's apparent break with precedent
in Girard:
An employee may receive specialized training and skills, and
learn the carefully guarded methods of doing business which are
trade secrets of a particular enterprise. To prevent an employee from utilizing such training and information in competition
with his former employer . . . restrictive covenants . . . are
enforced by the courts
as reasonably necessary for the protection
21
of the employer.'
The Girard majority, although not expressly requiring specialized
training, stated that it had considered all possible justifications for the
restriction, including the elements listed in Martucci, and had discov115. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 631, 136 A.2d 838,
846 (1957).
116. 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967).
117. Id. at 453, 235 A.2d at 620.
118. 456 Pa. 220, 318 A.2d 718 (1974).

119. Id. at 223-24, 318 A.2d at 720.
120. 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957).

121. Id. at 631, 136 A.2d at 846 (emphasis added).

ered no persuasive ones.1 2 2 Thus, personal contacts that enabled the
ex-employee to attract a substantial number of his former employer's
customers were not sufficient to warrant enforcement of the restrictive
covenant.
Justice Pomeroy vigorously dissented, 12 asserting his support
for the rationale of Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment

Corp." 4 and his belief that Girard represented a marked and unjustified departure from precedent. 2 5 His dissent may have influenced
the supreme court, for in Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron"' the Court

appears to qualify the specialized training requirement of Girard.
Close personal contacts existed between employee Aaron and customers of Sidco. Upon terminating his employment, Aaron entered into
successful competition with his former employer; in the month after
Aaron quit, Sidco's business fell from four hundred ninety thousand
to ninety thousand dollars. The supreme court affirmed the lower
court's grant of a preliminary injunction enforcing the covenant and
reaffirmed the holdings of the cases that Justice Pomeroy had found
127
irreconcilable with Girard.
Sidco is a practical solution to the situation in which an employee does not receive specialized training, but would be able to divert a
substantial number of his employer's customers if he were allowed to
compete. Good will is a legally cognizable interest and a proper
subject for a restrictive covenant. The employer's need for protection
may exist regardless of any specialized training of the employee. Although Girard is operative when enforcement of a covenant not to
compete is warranted by an employee's specialized or advanced training, the case is not the final word. Sidco, by not requiring a showing
of specialized training, illustrates a proper and practical balancing
of the needs of employees and employers.

28

In addition, the court

in Sidco realized that significant economic harm can be inflicted
upon an employer by a nonspecialist employee.
III. Remedies
A.

Injunction

The primary remedy available to an employer seeking to prevent
122. Girard Inv. Co. v. Bello, 456 Pa. 220, 224 n.2, 318 A.2d 718, 720 n.2
(1974); see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 516(f), comment h at 1001 (1932).
123. 456 Pa. at 224, 318 A.2d at 720.
124. 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967).
125. "In my view neither Bettinger, nor Jacobson, nor Hayes can be reconciled
with the result the court reaches today." 456 Pa. at 229, 318 A.2d at 723 (Pomeroy,
J., dissenting).
126. - Pa. -, 351 A.2d 250 (1976).
127. See - Pa. at -, 351 A.2d at 258 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
128. Girard Inv. Co. v. Bello, 456 Pa. 220, 225, 318 A.2d 718, 721 (1974)
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting); see note 125 supra.
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a former employee from violating a restrictive covenant is injunctive
relief. In every case in which a restraint was upheld an injunction was
issued to enjoin the employee from competing with his former employer for the duration of the restraint and to enjoin any prospective
employer in competition with the plaintiff from hiring the employ1 29
ee.
The injunctive process is uniquely effective against the practices
sought to be prevented by restrictive covenants. Remedies at law are
inadequate to compensate for the harm wrought by illegal competition. Customers once lost often remain lost to the employer. Trade
secrets once divulged are secrets no longer. Such damage cannot be
calculated in monetary terms. 8 ' Pending the outcome of litigation,
employers often seek preliminary injunctions against their ex-employees. The prerequisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction
are (1) a threat of immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be
compensated by damages, (2) a likelihood that greater injury will
result from refusal of the injunction than its issuance, and (3) an
ability to restore the status quo that existed immediately prior to the
alleged misconduct.1 3 ' A determination that the activity sought to be
restrained is actionable and that an injunction is reasonably suited to
abate the activity is also required. Unless the contract right is clear
and the wrong manifest, a preliminary injunction generally will not
2
be issued to restrain an employee from violating his covenant.'1
Although an injunction usually is issued only upon a showing of
irreparable harm, the standard is somewhat different when the court
is concerned with a restrictive covenant in an employment contract.
The essential determination in this situation is whether the covenant is
reasonable. 833 A typical case is Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v.
Vogel,'14 in which an injunction was sought to restrain a former
employee's competition in the mutual fund business. In addition, the
129.

Cases cited note 87 supra.

130.
131.

Papercraft Corp. v. Prescher, 121 Pitts. L.J. 71, 77 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1972).
Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181, 207 A.2d 768,

770 (1965); Alabama Binder & Chem. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp.,
410 Pa. 214, 220-21, 189 A.2d 180, 181 (1963); see Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, Pa. -, -, 351 A.2d 250, 257 (1976).

132.

Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 181, 207 A.2d 768,

770 (1965); Keystone Guild, Inc. v. Pappas, 399 Pa. 46, 159 A.2d 681 (1960);
Herman v. Dixon, 393 Pa. 33, 141 A.2d 576 (1958).
133. Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 103, 314 A.2d 296, 298

(1974).
134.

399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960).

ex-employee had enticed fourteen men trained and employed by
Pennsylvania Funds to accept employment with him. The court
granted the injunction, noting that Pennsylvania Funds had expended
considerable sums of money and time in creating good will and in
maintaining an extensive and continuous training program for its
employees. The injunction prohibited defendant from selling mutual
fund shares not only to customers or prospective customers of the
employer at the time of Vogel's employment, but also to the public-atlarge in Pennsylvania.
The ability of an employer to obtain an injunction, however, is
not unlimited. In National Merchandising Corp. v. Scope, Inc. 135
defendant employee, after terminating his employment with plaintiff,
established his own business in violation of a restrictive covenant. The
employer sought an injunction against both the ex-employee and
Scope, Inc., a firm selling commodities to defendant. The court
refused to issue an injunction against Scope because no employeremployee relationship existed between defendant and Scope. An
attempt to enjoin a third party extraneous to a restrictive covenant
will be denied as a restraint on trade. 18 6 Even the injunction granted
in Vogel had its limitations. The employer petitioned for an order
directing defendant to sever his contractual relationships with all
former employees of plaintiff, but defendant refused. The covenant
covered only the sale of mutual funds and certain plans. The primary
remedy of preventing direct competition could be achieved without
an unwarranted limitation of the ex-employee's right to contract and
37
do business outside the covenant's scope.'
B.

Damages

Often a restrictive covenant will provide for forfeiture of a specified sum of money by the party violating the covenant. In Bettinger
v. Carl Berke Associates, Inc.1 38 the restrictive covenant required
forfeiture of all commissions due the employee if he breached the
covenant. The restrictive covenant in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v.
Drayton139 mandated discontinuance of the employee's termination
payments upon breach of the restraint. In both cases the employees
contended that forfeiture was the employer's sole remedy and in both
cases the court rejected the contention and awarded an injunction
in addition to damages. 4 ° This is the proper result because the em135.
136.
137.
(1960).
138.
139.
140.

52 Luz. 299 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
Id. at 301.
Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 9, 159 A.2d 472, 476
455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974).
378 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs §§ 378, 384(2) (1932).
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ployer is not protected from the employee's competition by damages
alone. 141 A substantial sum of liquidated damages will not be considered a penalty since it is often impossible for the employer to determine the number of customers and the amount of profit lost to the
defendant. 1 42 A rather complete remedy was afforded plaintiff in
Jacobson & Co. v. InternationalEnvironment Corp.'4 3 In addition to
a permanent injunction for the duration of the covenant, the court
ordered an accounting of the breaching ex-employee's salary since
entering competition and an accounting of the profits IEC gained
from its participation in the willful breach of the restrictive covenant.
Some Pennsylvania decisions, on the other hand, have refused to
award damages in addition to injunctive relief. These cases hold it
unduly harsh for an ex-employee to suffer an out-of-pocket loss plus
the economic loss that normally accompanies a restrictive covenant.
The courts in Srolowitz v. Roseman14 1 and Caporaso v. Bornstein145
awarded injunctive relief, but refused claims for liquidated damages
of five hundred and one thousand dollars. Both courts characterized
the damage provisions of the restrictive covenants as penalties 4 and
rejected them without extensive comment. Their probable reasoning
was that the liquidated damages bore no reasonable relation to the
employer's injury. If this hypothesis is correct, these cases are not
contrary to the Pennsylvania position, which is consistent with the
modem trend of fully compensating the victim of a breach of contract, 1 47 that monetary damages are allowable upon a breach when
they are reasonably related to the injury.'
141. Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, - Pa. -,
351 A.2d 207 (1976) (accounting ordered); Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296
(1974); Roth v. Hartd, 365 Pa. 428, 75 A.2d 583 (1950); Vogelbacher v. Tennant,
18 Lack. 248 (Pa. C.P. 1917) (damages allowed); Simmonds v. Callaghan, 7 Berks
49, 28 York 142 (Pa. C.P. 1914) (bond forfeited).
142. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Becker, 11 Leb. 36, 44 (Pa. C.P. 1965), aff'd, 422
Pa. 531, 222 A.2d 873 (1966) ($2,000).

143.
-

427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967); see Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner,

Pa. -, 351 A.2d 207 (1976).
144. 263 Pa. 588, 107 A. 322 (1919).

145.

39 Pa. County Ct. 600 (C.P. North. 1911).

146. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
147. The supreme court recently stated in Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner,
Pa. -, -, 351 A.2d 207, 213 (1976),

148.

-

Where equity assumes jurisdiction for one or more purposes, it will

retain jurisdiction for all purposes to give complete relief and do complete

justice between the parties. This may include an award of equitable relief
not covered by the original prayer.
See Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Becker, 11 Leb. 36 (Pa. C.P. 1965), aff'd, 422 Pa. 531,
222 A.2d 873 (1966).

IV.

Conclusion

The Pennsylvania courts have adopted a practical approach to
the enforcement of restrictive covenants in employment contracts. Not
hesitating to look beyond black letter law to the economic realities of
each case, they have sought to strike a balance between protection of
the employer's interest and avoidance of hardship on the employee.
The courts have insured that restrictive covenants will not be used
for illegitimate purposes or result in unconscionable effects, while
making every attempt to enforce them in an equitable manner. Likewise, they have restricted application of covenants not to compete to
only those employees whose competitive practices, if unleashed, could
adversely effect an employer's business. In sum, Pennsylvania law on
restrictive covenants guarantees that neither party will be the victim of
injustice.
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